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Abstract
The paper briefly introduces and explains the essence of indigenous Oromo democracy and its
main characteristics that are relevant for the current condition of Africa in general and Oromo
society in particular. It also illustrates how Oromo democracy had functioned as a socio-political
institution by preventing oppression and exploitation and by promoting relative peace, security,
sustainable development, and political sovereignty, and how the gadaa system organized Oromo
society around economic, cultural and religious institutions. Finally, the paper explores how the
Oromo movement for national self-determination and multinational democracy struggles to
revive and revitalize the Oromo democratic tradition.

Introduction
Prior to their colonization during the European Scramble for Africa by the alliance of European
imperialism and Ethiopian colonialism (Holcomb and Ibssa, 1990; Jalata, 2005), the Oromo
people were independent and organized both culturally and politically using the gadaa system
(Oromo democracy) to promote their wellbeing and to maintain their security and sovereignty.
But, today, the Oromo do not have any autonomous or democratic political representation; they
have been ruled by the successive regimes of the Amhara-Tigray ethno-national groups that have
been supported by global powers (Jalata, 2005; Holcomb and Ibssa, 1990). The Ethiopian
colonial terrorism and genocide that started during the last decades of the 19th century still
continue in the 21st century. Ethiopia, former Abyssinia, has terrorized and committed genocide
on the Oromo people during the Scramble for Africa with the help of European imperial powers
such as England, France, and Italy.
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Without the expertise and the modern weapons they received from these European powers, the
Amhara-Tigray warlords could not colonize Oromia (the Oromo country). The Oromo and
Abyssinian peoples fought each other over territories, religions, and power between the 16th and
mid-19th centuries without defeating and colonizing each other. This balance of power was
changed by the intervention of the European colonial powers on the side of the Amhara-Tigray
warlords in the second half of the 19th century.
During Ethiopian colonial expansion, Oromia, “the charming Oromo land, [would] be
ploughed by the iron and the fire; flooded with blood and the orgy of pillage” (de Salviac, 2005
[1901]: 349). Calling this event as “the theatre of a great massacre,” Martial De Salviac (2005
[1901]: 349) states, “The conduct of Abyssinian armies invading a land is simply barbaric. They
contrive a sudden irruption, more often at night. At daybreak, the fire begins; surprised men in
the huts or in the fields are three quarter massacred and horribly mutilated; the women and the
children and many men are reduced to captivity; the soldiers lead the frightened herds toward the
camp, take away the grain and the flour which they load on the shoulders of their prisoners
spurred on by blows of the whip, destroy the harvest, then, glutted with booty and intoxicated
with blood, go to walk a bit further from the devastation. That is what they call ‘civilizing a
land.’” The Oromo oral history also testifies that Ethiopians/Abyssinians destroyed and looted
the resources of Oromia, and committed genocide on the Oromo people through massacre,
slavery, depopulation, cutting hands, famine, and diseases during and after the colonization of
Oromia.
According to Martial de Salviac (2005 [1901]: 350), “With equal arms, the Abyssinia
[would] never [conquer] an inch of land. With the power of firearms imported from Europe,
Menelik [Abyssinian warlord] began a murderous revenge.” The colonization of Oromia
involved human tragedy and destruction: “The Abyssinian, in bloody raids, operated by surprise,
mowed down without pity, in the country of the Oromo population, a mournful harvest of slaves
for which the Muslims were thirsty and whom they bought at very high price. An Oromo child
[boy] would cost up to 800 francs in Cairo; an Oromo girl would well be worth two thousand
francs in Constantinople” (de Salviac, 2005 [1901]: 28). The Ethiopian/Abyssinian government
massacred half of the Oromo population (five million out of ten million) and their leadership
during its colonial expansion (de Salviac, 2005 [1901]: 608, 278; Bulatovich, 2000: 66-68).
According to Alexander Bulatovich (2000: 68-69), “The dreadful annihilation of more than half
of the population during the conquest took away from the [Oromo] all possibilities of thinking
about any sort of uprising . . . Without a doubt, the [Oromo], with their least five million
population, occupying the best land, all speaking one language, could represent a tremendous
force if united.” The destruction of Oromo lives and institutions were aspects of Ethiopian
colonial terrorism.
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The surviving Oromo who used to enjoy an egalitarian democracy known as the gadaa
system were forced to face state terrorism, political repression, and an impoverished life.
Bulatovich (2000: 68) explains about the gadaa and notes, “the peaceful free way of life, which
could have become the ideal for philosophers and writers of the eighteenth century, if they had
known it, was completely changed. Their peaceful way of life is broken; freedom is lost; and the
independent, freedom loving [Oromos] find themselves under the severe authority of the
Abyssinian conquerors.” Ethiopian colonialists also destroyed Oromo natural resources and the
beauty of Oromia (the Oromo country): Oromia was “an oasis luxuriant with large trees” and
known for its “opulent and dark greenery used to shoot up from the soil” (de Salviac, 2005
[1901]: 21-22).
As de Salviac (2005 [1901]: 21) also notes, “the greenery and the shade delight the eyes
all over and give the landscape a richness and a variety which make it like a garden without
boundary. Healthful climate, uniform and temperate, fertility of the soil, beauty of the
inhabitants, the security in which their houses seem to be situated, makes one dream of
remaining in such a beautiful country.” As the Oromo people were killed, terrorized, and
repressed, the Oromo natural resources were depleted and their environment and natural beauty
were destroyed.
Human beings have basic attributes that Hussein Abdilahi Bulhan (1985: 262)
characterizes as “essential human needs and essential human powers” in order to survive and
develop fully. The people who were colonized and dominated cannot adequately satisfy their
basic needs and self-actualizing powers: “(a) biological needs, (b) sociability and rootedness, (c)
clarity and integrity of self, (d) longevity and symbolic immortality, (e) self-reproduction in
praxis, and (f) maximum self-determination.” Human beings must satisfy their basic biological
needs such as food, sex, clothing, and shelter to survive; these biological needs can only be
satisfied in a culture that provides sociability and rootedness. Those people whose culture has
been attacked and disfigured by colonialism are underdeveloped; their basic needs and selfactualizing powers are stagnated. According to Bulhan (185: 263), “For to acquire culture
presupposes not only a remarkable power of learning and teaching, but also an enduring capacity
for interdependence and inter-subjectivity. Not only the development of our higher power of
cognition and affect, but also the development of our basic senses rest on the fact that we are
social beings.”
Colonialism can be maintained by committing genocide or ethnocide and/or by organized
cultural destruction and the assimilation of a sector of the colonized population. Ethiopian
colonialists expropriated Oromo economic resources, such as land, and destroyed Oromo
institutions and cultural experts and leaders. They have also denied the Oromo opportunities for
developing the Oromo system of knowledge by preventing the transmission of Oromo cultural
experiences from generation to generation. All these were intended to uproot the Oromo cultural
identity and to produce individuals who lack self-respect and become submissive and ready to
serve the colonialists. Under these conditions, the Oromo basic needs and self-actualizing powers
have not been fulfilled.
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In other words, the Oromo biological and social needs have been frustrated. “If failure to satisfy
biological needs leads to disease and physical death,” Bulhan (1985: 263) notes, “then denial of
human contact, communication, and affirmation . . . leads to a social and psychological
‘starvation’ or ‘death’ no less devastating than, and conditioning, physical death.”
Furthermore, the Ethiopian colonialists have attempted to introduce social and cultural
deaths to the Oromo people in addition to millions of physical deaths for more than a century.
That is why the Amharas and Tigrayans are mad at the current revival of Oromo culture, history,
and the Oromo language, and the latter presently use the state machinery to control these
developments in order to promote their political agendas at the cost of the Oromo. Both the
Amhara and Tigrayan elites have also attempted to destroy Oromo selfhood in order to deny the
Oromo both individual and national self-determination. From all angels, they have tried their
best to prevent the Oromo from having clarity and integrity of Oromo self; they have prevented
the Oromo from establishing their cultural and historical immortality through reproducing and
recreating their history, culture and worldview, and from achieving maximum selfdetermination. “The pursuit of self-clarity is . . . intimately bound with the clarity developed first
about one’s body, the body’s boundary and attributes, and later one’s larger world. This pursuit
of clarity has survival, developmental, and organizing value. It entails both a differentiation from
as well as integration with others and with one’s past. Without some clarity of the self, however
tentative and tenuous, there can be no meaningful relating with others, no expression of inherent
human potentials, no gratification of essential needs” (Bulhan, 1985: 264)
The founding fathers and mothers of Oromo nationalism purposely engaged in political
praxis to save the Oromo individual and collective selves from psychological, social, and
physical deaths. Without a measure of self-determination a person cannot fully satisfy his/her
biological and social needs, self-actualize, and engage in praxis as an active agent to transform
society and oneself. “Self-determination refers to the process and capacity to choose among
alternatives, to determine one’s behavior, and to affect one’s destiny. As such, self-determination
assumes a consciousness of human possibilities, an awareness of necessary constraints, and a
willed, self-motivated engagement with one’s world” (Bulhan, 1985: 265). The revival of gadaa
empowers the Oromo to achieve their personal and national self-determination. The Oromo have
internal power to make their choices from the best possible alternatives and to have control on
what they do despite the fact that the Ethiopian colonialists have imposed on them nearly total
control to deny them the right of self-determination both individually and collectively.
Currently, the Oromo are an impoverished and powerless political minority because they
have been the colonial subjects of Ethiopia/Abyssinia since the last decades of the nineteenth
century. However, numerically speaking, today the Oromo are estimated at 40 million of the 80
million people in the Ethiopian Empire alone, and they are larger than combined numbers of
Tigrayans and Amharas. Some branches of the Oromo also live in Kenya and Somalia.
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To change their deplorable status, presently the Oromo national movement is engaged in struggle
to restore Oromo democracy and to liberate the Oromo people from all forms of oppression and
exploitation (Jalata, 2010; 2012). A few elements of the Oromo educated class clearly
understood the impact of Ethiopian colonialism on Oromo society by familiarizing themselves
with Oromo history, culture, values, and various forms of the Oromo resistance to Ethiopian
colonialism (Jalata, 1998).
These elements facilitated the emergence of the Oromo national movement in the 1960s
and 1970s by initiating the development Oromummaa (Oromo culture, identity, and
nationalism). Specifically, the emergence of the Macha-Tulama Self-Help Association in the
early 1960s and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) in the early 1970s marked the development
of Oromummaa and its national organizational structures. Since the 1980s, by replacing the
OLF’s Marxist-Leninist-Maoist ideology, gadaa has reemerged as the central political ideology
of the Oromo national movement (Jalata, 2005). As we shall see below, the revival of gadaa as
the Oromo democratic tradition is the central aspect of Oromummaa or Oromo nationalism.

Gadaa as the Totality of the Oromo Civilization
The critical and comprehensive understanding of the classical Oromo civilization requires
studying the historical, cultural, political, philosophical, religious, linguistic, and geographical
foundations of Oromo society. This is a monumental task that cannot be adequately achieved at
this historical moment. Currently our knowledge of the social and cultural history of Oromia (the
Oromo nation) is very limited and fragmented. For generations, the Oromo have mainly
transmitted their history and culture through oral discourse. Since Oromo scholars and others
have been discouraged or prohibited by the Ethiopian colonial state from documenting Oromo
oral traditions, adequate information is lacking. Due to the dominant role of oral history, Oromo
historiography requires a thorough and critical study of oral traditions. For the Oromo, as for
many African societies, the observation applies that “each time an old man [or a woman] dies a
library is lost.” The Ethiopian colonial state has suppressed the production, reproduction, and
dissemination of the intellectual knowledge of the people by destroying and/or suppressing
Oromo institutions, culture, and history.
For most Ethiopian and Ethiopianist scholars, Oromo history began in the 16th century
when the Oromo were actively recapturing their territories and rolling back the Christian and
Muslim empires (Jalata, 2005). The Oromo had at that time a form of constitutional government
known as gadaa (Luling, 1965; Baissa, 2004: 101). Although we have limited knowledge of
Oromo history before the 16th century, it is reasonable to think that this people did not invent the
gadaa system just at the moment they were consolidating themselves through defensive and
offensive wars and thereby entering "recorded history." Between the 16th and 19th, when various
peoples were fighting over economic resources in the Horn of Africa, the Oromo were
effectively organized under the gadaa institution for both offensive and defensive wars.
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As Virginia Luling (1965: 191) mentions, "from the mid-sixteenth to the mid-nineteenth
century the [Oromo] were dominant on their own territories; no people of other cultures were in
a position to exercise compulsion over them." There are adequate evidences that indicate the
Oromo people dominated the areas from Abyssinia, the Amhara-Tigray homeland, to Mombasa
and from Somalia to the Sudan (albeit there were no well demarcated boundaries) before they
were partitioned and colonized during the Scramble for Africa (Hambly, 1930: 176). To increase
our understanding of the classical Oromo civilization, it is necessary to demonstrate the
connections among Oromo peoplehood, culture, worldview, philosophy, religion, and politics.
Let us start our analysis of the Oromo classical civilization with indigenous Oromo democracy as
the central foundation of social and political institutions.

Oromo Democracy and its Major Principles
The indigenous gadaa system organized and ordered society around political, economic, social,
cultural, and religious institutions (Baissa, 1971, 1993; Legesse, 1973). We do not know when
and how this system emerged. However, we know that it existed as a full-fledged system at the
beginning of the sixteenth century. During this century, the Oromo were under one gadaa
administration (Baissa, 1993). According to Lemmu Baissa (2004: 101),

Gadaa government comprised a hierarchy of triple levels of government: the national, the
regional and the local. At the pan-Oromo level, the national government was led by an elected
luba council [leaders] formed from representatives of the major Oromo moieties, clan families
and clans, under the presidency of the abbaa gadaa and his two deputies . . . The national
leadership was responsible for such important matters as legislation and enforcement of general
laws, handling issues of war and peace and coordinating the nation’s defense, management of
intra-Oromo clan conflicts and dealing with non-Oromo people.

Gadaa has three interrelated meanings: it is the grade during which a class of people
assumes politico-ritual leadership, a period of eight years during which elected officials take
power from the previous ones, and the institution of Oromo society (Legesse, 1973; 2006).
Discussing the philosophy of Oromo democracy, Asmarom Legesse (1973: 2) notes, "What is
astonishing about this cultural tradition is how far Oromo have gone to ensure that power does
not fall in the hand of war chiefs and despots. They achieve this goal by creating a system of
checks and balances that is at least as complex as the systems we find in Western democracies."
Bonnie Holcomb (1991: 4) asserts that the gadaa system “organized the Oromo people in
an all-encompassing democratic republic even before the few European pilgrims arrived from
England on the shores of North America and only later built a democracy.”
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The gadaa system has the principles of checks and balances (through periodic succession of
every eight years), and division of power (among executive, legislative, and judicial branches),
balanced opposition (among five parties), and power sharing between higher and lower
administrative organs to prevent power from falling into the hands of despots. Other principles of
the system have included balanced representation of all clans, lineages, regions and
confederacies, accountability of leaders, the settlement of disputes through reconciliation, and
the respect for basic rights and liberties (Baissa, 1971, 1993). There have been five miseensas
(parties) in gadaa; these parties have different names in different parts of Oromia as the result of
Oromo expansion and the establishment of different autonomous administrative systems (Lepisa,
1975; Ibssa 1992).
All gadaa officials were elected for eight years by universal adult male suffrage. The
system organized male Oromos according to age-sets (hirya) based on chronological age, and
according to generation-sets (luba) based on genealogical generation, for social, political and
economic purposes. These two concepts – gadaa-sets (age-sets) and gadaa-grades (generationsets) – are important to a clear understanding of gadaa. All newly born males would enter a
gadaa-set at birth, which they would belong to along with other boys of the same age, and for the
next forty years they would go through five eight-year initiation periods; the gadaa-grade would
be entered on the basis of generation, and boys would enter their luba forty years after their
fathers (Legesse, 1973: 81). In incorporating the age-classification system, gadaa is similar to
age-sets practiced by the Masai, Kikuyu and the Nuer. However, its use of genealogical
generations as its organizing elements makes it different and unique.
In 1522, the Oromo had already begun to participate in the extensive and intensive struggle
in the Horn of Africa. This was before the Muslims seriously confronted Christian Abyssinia in
1527. In the first half of the 16th century, after two centuries of domination, the Muslims
destroyed Christian rule and established their own under the leadership of one Ahmed Gragn for
more than a decade.
The Oromo were caught in the wars of the Christian and Muslim empire-builders, and
according to Darrel Bates (1979: 7), "The [Oromo] . . . of the southern and western highlands
had suffered in their time from both parties, and were waiting in the wings for opportunities . . .
to recover lands which had been taken from them." Internally, an increase in both population and
cattle had exhausted the scarce resources; externally, the wars with both the Christians and the
Muslims endangered the Oromo's survival as people.
Butta wars occurred every eight years by the Oromo, when power transferred from one
gadaa grade to the next, and were organized for revenge, or for defensive and offensive
purposes. In the beginning of the 16th century, when they began to intensify their territorial
recovery and expansion through the butta wars, all Oromo were under one gadaa government.
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This factor, according to Asmarom Legesse (1973: 8, 10, 74), and the ability of the gadaa system
to consolidate the people both militarily and organizationally enabled them to expand or recover
their territories and accommodate their increased population and stock. Their recovery and
expansion signaled their survivability (Ta’a, 1986: 17). The Oromo fought twelve butta wars
between 1522 and 1618, recovering, expanding, and establishing Oromia (the Oromo country) to
its present boundaries (Ta’a, 1986: 21-28). In the course of their continued expansion into
various regions, different groups established autonomous gadaa governments. Various Oromo
groups kept their relations through the office of Abbaa Muuda (the father of anointment) (Ta’a,
1986: 10) and formed alliances or confederations during times of difficulty. The gadaa system
has a very logical structure, but because of the interlinking of the two concepts of belonging and
responsibility that are at its core, it is not easily accessible at first glance. Several descriptions are
offered here. John Hinnant (1978: 213-214) says:

[Gadaa] divides the stages of life, from childhood to old age, into a series of formal steps,
each marked by a transition ceremony defined in terms of both what is permitted and what
is forbidden. The aspect of gadaa, which throws the concept of age grading into confusion
is that of recruitment. A strict age-grade system assumes that an individual’s social passage
through life is in tune with his biological development. An individual enters the system at a
specific age and passes through transition rites at intervals appropriate to the passage from
childhood through full adulthood to senility. However, recruitment into the gadaa system is
not based upon biological age, but upon the recruitment that an individual remain exactly
five stages below his father’s level. Recruitment is thus based on the maintenance of one
socially defined generation between father and son.

Describing how gadaa currently works in the Borana region of Oromia, Asmarom Legesse
(1973: 8) asserts that “[Gadaa] is a system of classes (luba) that succeed each other every eight
years in assuming military, economic, political, and ritual responsibilities. Each gadaa class
remains in power during a specific term (gadaa), which begins and ends with a formal transfer
ceremony.” And “[society is organized] into two distinct but cross-cutting systems of peer group
structures. One is a system in which the members of each class are recruited strictly on the basis
of chronological age. The other is a system in which the members are recruited equally strictly
on the basis genealogical generations. The first has nothing to do with genealogical ties. The
second has little to do. Both types of social groups are formed every eight years. Both sets of
groups pass from one stage of development to the next every eight years” (Legesse, 1973: 5051).
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Despite the emergence of various autonomous gadaa administrations after the mid-17th
century, the central principles of the system remained intact. While establishing these
autonomous local governments, the Oromo formed alliances, federations, and confederations to
maintain their cultural and political solidarity and defend their security and interest from their
common enemies (Bulcha, 1996: 50; Etefa, 2008). The possession of institution of qaallu (the
spiritual leader) and the common gadaa government seems to have been what Mohamed Hassen
(1990: 9) terms “‘the special mark’ of the Oromo nation.” We have seen that Oromo males are
involuntarily recruited to both age-sets and generation-sets. Male children join age-sets as newly
born infants. Males born in the same eight-year period belong to an age-set. But they enter into
the system of gadaa grades forty years after their fathers, and since one grade is eight years,
fathers and sons are five grades apart. Male children can join advanced grades at birth, and may
join men or old men who are considered to be members of their genealogical generations. Older
men mentor young males in teaching rules and rituals, but the former treat the later as equals
since there is no status difference between the two groups in a gadaa class. Members of a gadaa
class share the same status and roles and perform their rights of passage from one grade to
another collectively.
Although some Oromo accepted Islam by force or as resistance to Ethiopian colonial
domination, and others were forced to accept Ethiopian Orthodox Christianity or willingly
accepted other forms of Christianity, their worldviews “are still hidden under the surface”
(Lambert, 1990: 42). Oromo prayers, blessings, and greetings manifest the Oromo worldview.
“The words of prayers, blessings and greetings continuously create and recreate connections
between the organizational and the cosmological structures,” P. T. W. Baxter (1990: 247) writes,
“such as the moieties and gaada.” Discussing the original system of Oromo thought and
worldview, Lambert Bartels asserts (1990: 15) that “whether they became Christians or Muslims,
the Oromo’s traditional modes of experiencing the divine have continued almost unaffected, in
spite of the fact that several rituals and social institutions in which it was expressed have been
very diminished or apparently submerged in new ritual cloaks.”
In Oromo society, knowledge and information have been mainly transmitted from
generation to generation through the institutions of family, religion, and gadaa. Young Oromo
are expected to learn important things that are necessary for social integration and community
development. They learn appropriate social behavior by joining age-sets and generation-sets.
From their families, communities and experts, they learn stories, folk tales, riddles, and other
mental games that help acquiring the knowledge of society. As age-mates, they share many
things because of their ages; members of generation-sets also share many duties and roles
because of their membership in grades or classes.
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At the stage of grade four “the gadaa classes and the age set come into being as a formal
corporate group: Leaders are elected for both groups. The name of the most senior man in each
group becomes the name of the group as a whole. The two groups then become cross-linked,
cross-cutting, structural units that operate as complementary institutions so long as they are
both represented by living members “ (Legessee, 1973: 58) [author’s emphasis]. Between the
third and fourth gadaa grades, boys become adolescent and initiated into taking serious social
responsibilities. The ruling group has responsibility to assign senior leaders and experts to
instruct and council these young men in the importance of leadership, organization, and warfare.
They also learn songs, parables, proverbs, cultural and historical maps, and other social skills
that they can use in public speech to praise the living and dead heroes or to criticize and ridicule
cowardice and traitors. Oratory, the art of public speaking, is highly valued in Oromo society;
“the forms of delivery, the wit of the speaker, his tone of voice, his posture, eye contact and
ability to command the attention of the audience” are skills to be honed and admired (Megersa,
1993: 36).
Young men are also trained to become junior warriors by taking part in war campaigns and
hunting large animals; they learn the practical skills of warfare, military organization, and
fighting so that they can engage in battle to defend their country and economic resources (Baxter,
1979: 69-95). P. T. W. Baxter (1979: 177) argues that the Oromo have used age-sets because
generation-sets “cannot be an efficient means to mobilise troops, and a quite distinct organisation
based on closeness of age . . . exists for that purpose.” In the Borana community, where many
elements of the gadaa system still exist, the assembly known as Gumi Gayyo (the assembly of
multitudes) brings together every type of important living leaders, such as living– Abba Gaddas,
the qaallus, age-set councilors, clan leaders and gadaa councilors, and other concerned
individuals – to make or amend or change laws and rules every eight years (Huqqaa, 1998). The
Gumi Gayyo assembly has the highest degree of authority than the gadaa and other assemblies,
and other assemblies cannot reverse its decisions (Legessee, 1973: 93).
The Abbaa Boku (the father of scepter) was a ‘chairman’ who presided over the assembly.
According to G. W. B. Huntingford (1955: 54): “The Abbaa Boku and his two colleagues are
chosen from the oldest or most distinguished families, which are known as `families of Hayu.'
The principal function of the Abbaa Boku is to preside over the parliament . . . to proclaim the
laws, and to act when necessary as ritual expert in the gadaa-ceremonies.” Abbaa Gadaa is
another name for Abbaa Boku.
The Abbaa Duula (the defense minister) was also one of the leading figures in the gadaa
government. He was the leader of qondala (army) and was elected by the people. His main
responsibility included assisting the Abbaa Boku, especially during the time of war. The Abbaa
Boku was also supported by a council, known as shanee or salgee, and retired gadaa officials.
Gadaa laws were passed by the caafee (assembly) and implemented by officials. There was no
taxation under this system except that gadaa leaders and their families were provided with
necessary materials, such as food.
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Despite kinship relationships are being such an important factors in Oromo society, those
who are elected to office are expected to serve without regard to kinship ties. Nobody is above
the rule of law in Oromo democracy. Lemmu Baissa (1993: 11) expresses the view that the
gadaa system “as a whole “provided . . . the machinery for democratic rule and enjoyment of
maximum liberty for the people.” Despite the gadaa system being an egalitarian social system,
women were excluded from passing through age-sets and generation-sets. Gadaa effectively
enforced a gender-based division of labor in Oromo society, although it allowed two equally
important separate and interdependent economic domains.
Explaining how the gadaa system brought these two domains together by establishing
mechanisms of balancing, regulating, and safeguarding these domains, Qabbannee Waqayyo
(1991: 8) argues that “men have controlled the mobile resources -- those that required going out
from the homestead – herding, defense of livestock and land, tilling new fields, plowing, etc.
Women have controlled the stationary resources – the house, the grain and other products of the
fields once they are brought into gotara for storage, etc. Even the cattle around the house are
under their control; women milk them, decide how much milk goes to the calves, how much to
the people in the household for drinking, how much for butter or cheese to eat or sell, how much
to guests who bring valuable information, become friends in time of need.”
The balancing of the domains of women and men and maintaining their interdependence
have been preconditions for keeping peace between the sexes and for promoting safu (moral and
ethical order) in society (Kelly, 1992). “By exercising a real day-to-day control over the
disposition of the resources at every point of the decision-making process in ways that are
protected by the value system of society,” Waqayyo (1991: 9) writes, “the woman wields
determinative influence in the society as a whole.” The gadaa system and the siiqqee institution
had influenced the value system of Oromo society. In pre-colonial Oromo society, women had
the siiqqee institution, a parallel institution to the gadaa system that “functioned hand in hand
with Gadaa [sic] system as one of its built-in mechanisms of checks and balances” (Kumsa,
1997: 119). These two institutions helped maintain safu in Oromo society by enabling Oromo
women to have control over resources and private spaces, social status and respect, and
sisterhood and solidarity by deterring men from infringing upon their individual and collective
rights (Kumsa, 1997: 115-145). If the balance between men and women was broken, a siqqee
rebellion was initiated to restore the law of God and the moral and ethical order of society.
When there were violations of their rights, women left their homes, children, and resources
and traveled to a place where there was a big tree called qilxxu and assembled there until the
problems were solved through negotiation by elders of men and women (Kumsa, 1997: 129130). According to Kuwee Kumsa (1997: 126), “Married women have the right to organize and
form the siiqqee sisterhood and solidarity. Because women as a group are considered halaga
[non-relative] and excluded from the Gadaa grades, they stick together and count on one another
through siiqqee which they all have in common . . . in the strange gosa [lineage] where women
live as strangers, siiqqee represents the mother and they even address each other as `daughters of
a mother.’
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They get together regularly for prayers as well as for other important individual and community
matters. If men try to stop women from attending these walargee (meetings), it is considered
against safu.”
Oromo women used different siiqqee mechanisms to maintain their rights; such
mechanisms included the law of muuka laaftu (soften wood), the abarsa (curse), iyya siiqqee
(scream), and godaana siiqqee (trek). As Kumsa comments, “because of their liminality, women
wield a special religious power where they draw an enormous moral and ritual authority. Men,
therefore, try to avoid their curse and seek their blessings . . . `Women in general are
symbolically and politically liminal and correspondingly enjoy special sacred power as a class.’ .
. . people respect and revere a woman because Waaq made her to be respected and revered . . . .
Interference with a woman’s sacred authority is regarded as violating seera Waaq and safu”
(Kumsa, 1997: 127).
A man who violated women’s individual and collective rights could be corrected through
reconciliation and pledging not to repeat the mistakes or through women’s reprisal ritual: A
group of women “ambush the offender in the bush or on the road, bind him, insult him verbally
using obscene language that they would not normally utter in the direct presence of an adult male
. . . pinch him, and whip him with leafy branches or knotted strips of cloth. In extreme cases,
they may force him to crawl over thorny or rocky ground while they whip him . . . They demand
livestock sacrifice as the price to cease their attack. If he refuses, they may tie him to a tree in the
bush and seize one of his animals themselves. Other men rarely intervene ” (Kelly, 1992: 187).
With the colonization of the Oromo people and the destruction of gadaa and siiqqee institutions
Oromo women have been subjected to three levels of oppression: racial/ethno-national, class,
and gender oppression. How did the social structures of the Oromo society work before
colonization?

The Origin and Branches of the Oromo
Between the 12th and 13th centuries, the Oromo were already organized into two confederations
or moieties known as Barentu and Borana (Hassen, 1990: 4-6). All Oromo subgroups can and do
trace their genealogies to these confederations. Practically, however, it is not possible “to trace in
detail the manner in which further division and the formation of” these moieties, sub-moieties,
clans, and lineages did occur (Haberland, 1963: 775). According to the Oromo oral tradition,
these Borana and Barentu moieties descended from the same family stock called Oromo (Baxter
1983: 129-149).
Despite the fact that the Oromo claim that they descended from the same family stock,
Oromo, they do not limit their kinships to biological ancestry. The Oromo kinship system has
been based on a biological and social descent. The Oromo recognize social ancestry and avoid
the distinction between the biological and social descent since they know that the formation of
Oromo peoplehood was based on the biological and social kinship.
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The Oromo have had a long history of cultural contacts with non-Oromo through war,
marriage, economic relationship, and group adoption (Baxter, 1994: 174; Braukamper, 1989:
428). However, when there were wars and conflicts between the Oromo and their neighbors on
economic and cultural resources, such as land, water, territory, trade route, and religious and
political issues, the former imposed specific cultural policies to structurally and culturally change
the conquered people in order to Oromoize them and consolidate Oromo society. Oromo laws
strictly forbade the distinction between the social and biological descents (Megerssa, 1993: 27).
P. T. W. Baxter (1994: 174) explains that “the adoption of adults, and often all their dependents
used to be a common practice, which thereby incorporated them and their descendants into the
family, and hence into the lineage, clan . . . These practices, though almost certainly widespread
and frequent, took place despite the firm ideological contention that descent and inheritance were
both rigidly patrilineal. Oromo social theory, like most others, was often very flexible in
practice.”
Through the process of group or individual adoption known as moggaasa or guudifacha,
non-Oromo were adopted to Oromo gossa (confederation of clans), and were structurally and
culturally Oromoized; these assimilated Oromo trace their descent to Oromo moieties and to the
original Oromo (Braukamper, 1980: 25). Non-Oromo neighbors who were defeated in war or
who wanted to share resources with Oromo groups would be adopted to the Oromo gossa: “The
adopted groups now become collectively the `sons’ of gossa . . . this arrangement was inspired
by political, military and economic considerations, though clearly it is couched in the symbolism
of kinship and affiliation” (Blackhurst, 1978: 243). The original two moieties, Borana and
Barentu, had one overarching political structure called the gadaa system that helped fashion
Oromo relations within themselves and with outsiders, but evolved the mechanisms for
incorporating new members. According to Hector Blackhurst (1978: 243-244), “Oromo political
structure as it existed before [the sixteenth century] expansion began was flexibly centralized, in
that major office holders were located at fixed points but power was sufficiently diffused
throughout the system to enable local-level decision making to continue without constant
reference back to the center. However, the whole system was renewed spiritually and structurally
by the meetings at the caafee where legal matters were discussed and the law laid down or
reiterated.”
Although the Oromo had a biologically- and socially-constructed complex kinship system,
as we will see below, the formation and expression of Oromo peoplehood are mainly culturally
shaped (Baxter 1994: 248). A better understanding of Oromo peoplehood and cultural identity
requires the identification and exploration of the main characteristics and essence of Oromo
social organizations and politico-religious institutions. Let us have some understanding of the
Oromo kinship system on macro and micro-levels since it has been the basic social structure for
defining common interests in resource management and utilization and in the process of
establishing political and religious leadership and in forming leagues or confederations among
Oromo society.
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These leagues or confederations were based on a complex kinship system. The Oromo call the
largest kinship system gossa, which is subdivided into moiety, sub-moiety and qomo (clan).
These subdivisions have lower-order branches of kinship known as mana (lineage), balbala
(minor lineages), and warra (minimal lineage or extended family) (Legesse, 1973: 37-42;
Knutsson, 1967; Kelly, 1992: 40-63).
Wherever the Oromo were divided into sub-moieties and clans, there is “clear distinction
between clans and lineages. The clan (qomo) is first of all a social group, consisting of several
descent groups who need not all be Oromo. The heart of every clan is compounded of a cluster
of lineages tracing their descent to the ancestor who gave his name to the clan” (Bartels, 1990:
205). There were five sets of sub-moieties that extended from the Borana and Barentu moieties:
the Sabbo and the Gona, the Macha and Tulama, and the Raya and Assabo, the Siko and the
Mando, and the Itu and Humbana (Megerssa, 1993: 24-37). The first three sets belong to Borana,
and the second two sets are branches of Barentu. The descendants of these moieties occupy
specific areas in Oromia today: The Raya and Assabo branches occupy northern Oromia (i.e.,
include some part of Tigray, the whole of Wallo and some part of northern Shawa). The regions
of Macha and Tulama include most of the present regions of Shawa, Wallaga, Ilubabor, and the
Gibe region. The branches of Sabbo and Gona occupy some part of the present Sidamo, part of
Gammu-Gofa, and Borana, Gabra, and Guji lands, and some part of Kenya. The descendants of
Siko and Mando occupy the Arssi and Bale lands, and some part of the Rift Valley. Finally, the
branches of Itu and Humbana live in most of Haraghe and some part of Wallo in the north.
Nevertheless, there have not been demarcated boundaries among these parts of Oromia.
Whenever members of these moieties are asked to identify their descents, they always
provide the name of their moieties, rather than their lineages. The complexity of the Oromo
kinship system is demonstrated by the existence of similarly named putative descent groups on
the macro and micro kinship levels across the whole spectrum of Oromo society (Baxter, 1994:
177). Because of these complexities and the paucity of data, it is impossible at this time to fully
reconstruct the Oromo kinship system. Linguistic, anthropological and historical data have
linked the Oromo to the so-called eastern Cushitic-speaking peoples who have been in the Horn
of Africa as far as their history is known (Lewis, 1966). These so-called eastern Cushitic
speakers were historically, geographically, culturally and linguistically connected peoples. The
Oromo have lived for their known history in the Horn of Africa as these related peoples
(Greenfield and Hassen, 1980: 3).
Before the Arab elements immigrated to the Horn of Africa and mixed with some
indigenous African peoples and developed into the Abyssinians or Habashas, the Horn of Africa
was the home of the so-called Cushitic and other peoples. The Cushitic-speaking peoples settled
on the central “Abyssinia/Ethiopian” Plateau, and were differentiated into subgroups. The
Oromo were one of these groups that moved southward (Melbaa 1980: 5; Ehret, 1976). The
Oromo have complex worldview, philosophy, and religion, as we shall see below.
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Oromo Worldview, Philosophy, and Religion
Oromo society like any society has been conscious of its cultural identity, its relation to nature,
and the existence of a powerful force that regulates the connection between nature and society.
The Oromo knowledge of society and the world can be classified into two: a) cultural and
customary knowledge known as beekumsa aadaa, and b) knowledge of laws known as beekumsa
seera. The knowledge of laws is further subdivided into seera Waaqa (the laws of God), and
seera nama (the laws of human beings). The laws of God are immutable, and the laws of human
beings can be changed thorough consensus and democratic means. Oromo customary knowledge
is a public and common knowledge that guides and regulates the activities of members of
society; some elements of this customary knowledge can develop into rules or laws depending on
the interest of society (Megerssa, 1993: 20-23).
Every person is expected to learn and recognize seera Waaqa and seera aadaa; however,
should someone does not know the laws of society or the laws of God, there are Oromo experts
who can be referred to. These experts study and know the organizing principles of the Oromo
worldview that reflect Oromo cultural memory and identity both temporally and religiously
(Megerssa, 1993: 20-23). Oromo institutions can be better understood by studying the Oromo
concept of social development (finna). As in any society, social changes occur in Oromo society
by combining the cumulative historical experiences with the contemporary condition. Hence
finna “represents the legacy of the past which each generation inherits from its forefathers [and
foremothers] and which it transforms; it is the fertile patrimony held in trust by the present
generation which it will enrich and bequeath to future generations . . . [it describes] a developing
of the inner potential of society based on the cultural roots it has already laid down” (Kassam,
2007).
The Oromo concept of social development is constructed in seven interconnected phases:
Gudina, gabbina, ballina, badhaadha, hoormata, dagaaga, and dagaa-hoora. When gudina
indicates an improvement in cultural life due to the introduction of new experiences to Oromo
society, gabbina involves the process of integrating cumulative cultural experiences with
contemporary social conditions through broadening and deepening the system of knowledge and
worldview. According to Aneesa Kassam (2007) “This can only be achieved through the full
knowledge, consent and active participation of all members of the community. This implies the
existence of a political organization, the forum for debate and the democratic means of reaching
a consensus on all decisions affecting the common good. This should be obtained without force
or coercion, without excluding the interests of any group, within the Oromo society and outside
it, in the broader context of the national or international arena. To this end, the Oromo evolved a
political process of power sharing reputed for its highly egalitarian nature: Gadaa.”
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Without gadaa or Oromo democracy there cannot be finna (development), peace, social
justice, kao (freedom, peace, prosperity, success, and happiness), and safu. Gabbina emerges
through democracy, peace, cooperation and consensus of all members of Oromo society of
different levels to improve economic, cultural, and political conditions. Next to gabbina, there is
a ballina phase. Ballina involves the expansion of enriched cultural and political experiences
from Oromo society to another society through reciprocity of cultural borrowing and resources
sharing and interdependence, based on the principles of democracy. This is the phase that
focuses on foreign relations. It allows Oromo society to involve in cultural exchange and
cooperation with neighboring peoples. The cumulative experiences of gudina, gabbina, and
ballina lead to the phase of badhaadha (richness). Theoretically badhaadha is a phase at which
the Oromo and their neighbors who accept their philosophy of social development obtain peace,
prosperity, and wholeness since there are no incidences of conflict, poverty, disease, and natural
calamities.
The badhaadha phase of development can only be achieved when there is peace between
Waaqa (God), uuma (nature), and society. According to Baxter (1990: 238), human beings “must
keep right with each other in order to keep right with God, and they must keep right with God to
keep right with each other. Good social relationships and proper ritual relationships are reflexes
of each other. Violence between men is both a cause and effect of God’s displeasure.” The
development of this stage facilitates the emergence of the hoormaata phase. During this phase,
animals and people reproduce and multiply because of availability of abundant resources and
peace. Following this phase there is a development phase known as dagaaga; this is the stage at
which development cycles are assessed and integrated to maintain even and sustainable
development. At the final stage of development called daga-hoora, Oromo society expands its
cumulative cultural experiences of development to neighboring peoples through different
mechanisms depending on a given condition. Sometimes, at this stage the Oromo had conflict
with their neighbors because of the competition over resources, such as land and water.
Until the last decades of the nineteenth century, when European imperialist intervention
changed the balance of power in favor of the Abyssinians, the Oromo easily defeated their
competitors due to their gadaa organizational capacity and military capability. The Oromo
religion called Waaqeefana, worldview, philosophy, and politics have been interconnected and
influenced one another. Oromo religious and philosophical worldview considers the organization
of spiritual, physical and human worlds as interconnected phenomena, and Waaqa, the creator,
regulates their existence and functions in balanced ways. Explaining how Oromos believe that
Waaqa directs the world from above and controls everything from within, Kassam (2007)
expounds that the “image of creation has important consequences for the Oromo vision of the
universe as a whole. It has influenced among other aspects of its traditional culture, its political
and economic thought, and determined its traditional system of government and modes of
production.”
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The Oromo use three concepts to explain the organization and interconnection of human,
spiritual and physical worlds. These three concepts are ayaana (spirit), uuma (nature), and safu
(moral and ethical order). The Oromo believe that through ayaana, Waaqa (God) creates and
regulates human and physical worlds in balanced ways. This ayaana also maintains the
connection between the creator and the created. Oromo society has organizing principles for its
known and unknown universe like any society; and ayaana is a major organizing principle of
Oromo cosmology through which the concepts of time and creation are ordered (Kassam, 2007).
Ayaana as a system of classification and an organizing principle of Oromo cosmology
establishes the connection between Waaqa (the Creator/God) and the created (nature and society)
by differentiating and at the same time uniting the created things and the Creator (Kassam,
2007). The Oromo believe that Waaqa, the Supreme Being, created ayaana and uses it to
organize scattered things into order. As Gemetchu Megerssa (1993: 95) explains, “ayaana is the
mechanism by which the creator propels itself into becoming its own opposite, and dwells in that
which it creates. This is then transposed to explain the basic principles that embed themselves in
the diverse Oromo institutions, since there is no distinction between the laws of thought, the laws
of nature, history and society.” The concept uuma includes everything created by Waaqa
including ayaana. Safu is an ethical and moral “code that Oromos use to differentiate bad from
good and wrong from right . . . [S]afu `constitutes the ethical basis upon which all human action
should be founded; it is that which directs one on the right path; it shows the way in which life
can be best lived’” (Megerssa, 1993: 255).
The Oromo claim that the understanding of laws of Waaqa, nature, and society both
morally and ethically and living accordingly is necessary. They believe in God’s law and the law
of society that they establish through the gadaa system of democracy to maintain nagaa (peace)
and safu among Waaqa, society, and nature to achieve their full human destiny known as kao or
kayyo (Hinnant, 1978: 210). Respect for the laws of Waaqa and gadaa have been essential to
maintain nagaa Oromo (Oromo peace) and safu (moral balance) in society (Hinnant, 1978: 207243: Knutsson, 1967; de Loo, 1991).
Most Oromos believe that they had full kao before their colonization since they had
freedom to develop their independent political, economic, cultural and religious institutions.
Original Oromo religious leaders, qaallus, have had a moral authority and social obligation to
oppose tyrants and support popular Oromo democracy and gadaa leaders, and to encourage
harmonious and democratic relations based on the principles of safu, kao, Waaqa, and uuma. The
qaallu “is thought to possess sacred characteristics that enable him to act as intermediary
between the people and . . . [God],” and “he had no administrative power, but could bless or
withhold blessings from gadaa leadership, and had an extraordinary power to curse anyone who
threatened the wellbeing of the entire community by deviating from . . . [God’s] order” (Kelly,
1992: 166).
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The qaallu institution has been committed to social justice, the laws of God, and the rule of
law, and fair deliberation; the qaallu “residence was considered politically neutral ground,
suitable for debating controversial issues and for adjudicating highly charged disputes, although
he himself might not take a prominent role in proceedings” (Kelly, 1992: 166). The qaallu
institution has played an important role in protecting original Oromo culture, religion,
worldview, and identity. When those Oromos who were influenced by this institution kept their
Oromo names, most Oromos who were converted to Islam or Christianity willingly or by force
abandoned their Oromo names and adopted Muslim or Christian names depending on their
borrowed religion. The qaallu can be credited with having played an indirect role in the
preservation of the Oromo identity and the Oromo political system. The criteria to be a qallu
included seniority in lineages, respectability in the community, expertise in ritual practices,
moral qualification, respect for cultural taboos, sound social status, and other leadership qualities
(Knutsson, 1967: 66-67). The leader of all qallus was known as Abbaa Muuda (father of the
anointment) who was considered to be the prophet and spiritual leader of Oromo society. Oromo
pilgrims traveled to the residence of Abbaa Muuda to receive his blessing and anointment to be
ritual experts in their respective regions (Knutsson, 1967: 148).
Abbaa Muuda served as the spiritual center and symbol of Oromo unity and assisted all
Oromo branches to keep in touch with one another for several centuries; “as the Jews believe in
Moses and the Muslims in Muhammad, the Oromo believe in their Abbaa Muuda [sic]”
(Hassen, 1991: 79). Abbaa Muuda like other qaallu leaders encouraged harmonious and
democratic relations in Oromo society. According to the qaallu mythology, Abbaa Muuda, the
original Oromo religious leader was descended from heaven (Knutsson, 1967; Gololcha, 1988).
Oromo representatives traveled to the highlands of the mid-south Oromia to honor Abbaa Muuda
and to receive his blessing and anointment that qualified them as pilgrims known as jilas to be
ritual experts in their respective areas (Knutsson, 1967: 148). When Oromo representatives went
to him from far and near places to receive his blessings, Abbaa Muuda commanded them “not to
cut their hair and to be righteous, not to recognize any leader who tries to get absolute power,
and not to fight among themselves” (knutsson, 1967: 148).
In its modified form, the qaallu institution exists in some parts of Oromia, such as in the
Guji and Borana areas; it still protects an Oromo way of life, such as dispensing of local justice
based on Oromo customs and providing solutions to problems created by a changing social
condition (Knutsson, 1967: 133-135). The qallus of Guji and Borana are ritual leaders, advisors,
and ritual experts in the gadaa system. The qallus “possess the exclusive prerogative of
legitimizing the different gadaa officials, when a new gadaa group is initiated into the politically
active class” (Knutsson, 1967: 142). The Oromo still practice some elements of Oromo
democratic values in the areas where the gadaa system was suppressed a century ago. The gadaa
system is still practiced in the Borana and Guji regions under the control of the Ethiopian
colonial system in its modified form; it helps maintain peace, exchange knowledge and practice
rituals among some clans and regional groups (de Loo, 1991: 25).
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The current gadaa of Borana and Guji cannot fully reflect its original political culture under
Ethiopian colonialism. Theoretically, most Oromos including those intermediaries who are
collaborating with the enemies of the Oromo recognize the importance of gadaa, and some
Oromo nationalists struggle to restore genuine Oromo democracy.

Efforts for Reviving and Revitalizing Oromo Democracy
Some core Oromo nationalist scholars advocate that without refining and restoring elements of
the original Oromo political culture of gadaa, the Oromo society cannot fully develop
Oromummaa, which is absolutely necessary to achieve national self-determination, statehood,
and democratic governance. Recognizing that Oromo identity and peoplehood are an expression
of Oromo culture, some Oromo nationalist scholars have started to study the cultural foundations
of Oromo society to understand the whole essence of this society. Such scholars believe that
studying, understanding, and restoring the original Oromo political institutions by refining and
adapting them to contemporary conditions are practical steps towards unifying and consolidating
the Oromo national movement.
Some Oromo nationalists have already started to develop Oromummaa ideals based on
original Oromo cultural foundations. The Oromo national struggle has initiated the Oromo
cultural movement based on the following Oromo concepts: Oromummaa, gootummaa (bravery
and patriotism), walabummaa (sovereignty), bilisummaa (liberation), gadaa (popular Oromo
democracy), nagaa (peace), and kao or kayyo (prosperity and peace) (Jalata, 2007). Furthermore,
core Oromo nationalist leaders assert today that all concerned Oromos should participate in
revitalizing the Oromo national movement by applying some elements of gadaa, aiming at
establishing a future Oromia state, sharing sovereignty with others, implementing internal peace
within the Oromo society, and promoting peace with Oromia’s neighbors. They also note that the
Oromo national struggle has now reached at a level where it requires mass mobilization and
participation in order to succeed. In this mobilization, they recommend the movement to use the
ideology and principles of gadaa democracy enshrined in Oromummaa to mobilize the entire
nation spiritually, financially, militarily, and organizationally to take coordinated political and
military actions.
Gadaa, as an emblem of an Oromo cultural totality with its democratic traditions, has
also become an ideological expression of the Oromo national movement. Holcomb (1993: 4)
notes, “Gadaa represented an ideological basis for the expression of Oromo nationalism. This
expression empowered the Oromo to resist oppression, become self-conscious as a nation in the
twentieth century in the face of intense subjugation . . . Gadaa represents a repository, a
storehouse of concepts, values, beliefs and practices that are accessible to all Oromo. The
challenge the Oromo face now is the serious of fashioning elements of the heritage into an
ideology, which empowers the nation to achieve the self-determination that the people aspire to.”
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Also, a few Oromo scholars suggest that Oromo political organizations need to use the
Oromo political wisdoms and experiences in order to reach the national organizational capacity
and to throw off the chains of Ethiopian colonialism. They also recommend that after bringing
together gadaa experts and Oromo intellectuals who are familiar with the Oromo democratic
traditions, the Oromo national movement should start to formulate procedures, strategies, and
tactics for building a national assembly with supreme authority called Gumii Oromia. At this
national Gumii, they suggest representatives of all Oromo sectors, all serious and independent
Oromo liberation fronts and organizations should carry out their national obligations. This
national Gumii must be modeled after the Gumii Gayyo:
In Oromo democratic traditions, the highest authority does not reside in the great lawmakers who
are celebrated by the people, nor the rulers who are elected to govern for eight years, nor
hereditary rights, nor the age-sets and age-regiments who furnish the military force, nor the
abbaa duula who lead their people in battle. It resides, instead, in the open national assembly, at
which all gadaa councils and assemblies . . . active and retired are represented, and warra
Qaallu, the electors, participate as observers. The meetings that take place every eight years
review the conduct of the ruling gadaa council, punish any violators of law, and remove any or
all of them from office, should that become necessary. In such sessions, a retired abbaa gadaa
presides. The primary purpose of the meetings of the national assembly, however, it to reexamine the laws of the land, to reiterate them in public, to make new laws if necessary, and to
settle disputes that were not resolved by lower levels in their judicial organization (Legesse
2006, 211).
The Gumii Gayyo is an expression of the exemplar model of the unwritten Oromo
constitution. Reframing and transforming the unwritten Oromo constitution into a new written
national constitution based on Oromo democratic principles require absolute commitment from
Oromo nationalists and their organizations. As Asmarom Legesse (2006: 255) puts, “Oromo
democracy is not perfect: if it were, it would not be democratic. Like all democratic institutions,
it is the product of changing human thought that must always be re-examined in relation to
changing historic circumstances.” The underlying assumption is that by establishing the National
Assembly of Gumii Oromia, Oromo nationalists and organizations of the Oromo national
movement aim to frame a written Oromo constitution by adapting older Oromo political
traditions to new circumstances while also learning from other democratic practices. Those who
promote the idea of building Gumii Oromia recommend that the Oromo national movement
needs to address three major issues. The first issue is to further develop Oromummaa to its
fullest capacity by overcoming its unevenness and deficiencies. This will strengthen the Oromo
national organizational capacity.
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Between the times when the Oromo were colonized and until Oromo nationalism emerged,
Oromoness primarily existed on personal and the interpersonal levels since the Oromo were
denied opportunities to form national institutions. Expressed Oromoness was targeted for
destruction; colonial administrative regions established to suppress the Oromo people and exploit
their resources. As a result, Oromo relational identities have been localized and not strongly
connected to a collective Oromo national identity. The Oromo were forcibly separated from one
another and prevented from exchanging goods and information with one another for more than a
century. They were exposed to different cultures (i.e., languages, customs, values, etc.) and
religions and borrowed an array of them. Consequently, today there are Oromos who have
internalized these externally imposed regional or religious identities because of their low level of
political consciousness or because of their political opportunism. The Oromo people who did not
develop national political consciousness still confuse clan, regional or religious politics with
Oromo national politics.
Overcoming these political weaknesses by building Oromo national organizational
capacity is only possible when Oromummaa as a national vision is accepted, energizes and unites
the entire Oromo nation. As an element of culture, nationalism, and vision, national Oromummaa
has the power to serve as a manifestation of the collective identity of the Oromo national
movement. The basis of national Oromummaa must be built on overarching principles that are
embedded within Oromo traditions and culture and, at the same time, have universal relevance
for all oppressed peoples. The main foundations of national Oromummaa are rooted in the rights
of individual and collective freedom, justice, popular democracy, and human liberation, which
are built on the concept of safu (Oromo moral and ethical order) and are enshrined in gadaa
principles. As the ideology of the Oromo national movement, national Oromummaa enables the
Oromo to retrieve their cultural memories, assess the consequences of Ethiopian colonialism, and
give voice to their collective grievances. National Oromummaa enables the Oromo people to
form alliances with all political forces and social movements that accept the principles of
national self-determination and multinational democracy in promotion of a global community
that will be free from all forms of oppression and exploitation. Therefore, Oromummaa is seen as
a complex and dynamic national and global project.
As a national project and the central ideology of the Oromo national movement,
Oromummaa enables the Oromo to mobilize diverse cultural resources, interlink Oromo
personal, interpersonal and collective (national) relationships, and assists in the development of
Oromo-centric political strategies and tactics that can mobilize the nation for collective action
empowering the people for liberation. As a global project, Oromummaa requires that the Oromo
national movement be inclusive of all persons operating in a democratic fashion. This global
Oromummaa enables the Oromo people to form alliances with all political forces and social
movements that accept the principles of national self-determination and multinational democracy
in promotion of a regional and global humanity that will be free of all forms oppression and
exploitation. In other words, global Oromummaa is based on the principles of mutual solidarity,
social justice, and popular democracy.
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The foundation of Oromummaa must be built on overarching principles that are embedded
within the Oromo democratic tradition and culture and, at the same time, have universal
relevance for all oppressed peoples. Although, in recent years, many Oromos have become
adherents of Christianity and Islam, the concept of Waaqa (God) lies at the heart of Oromo
traditions and culture. In Oromo traditions, Waaqa is the creator of the universe and the source of
all life. The universe created by Waaaq contains within itself a sense of order and balance that is
to be made manifest in human society. Although Oromummaa emerges from Oromo cultural and
historical foundations, it goes beyond culture and history in providing a liberative narrative for
the future of the Oromo nation as well as the future of other oppressed peoples, particularly those
who suffer under the Ethiopian Empire. Those Oromos who endorse and glorify Ethiopianism
and clan/regional politics are undermining Oromummaa in order to enjoy power and material
benefits at the cost of the Oromo nation and other peoples.
Without recognizing the centrality of Oromummaa for the national struggle, the Oromo
cannot develop a victorious consciousness that equips them with the knowledge of liberation.
Oromummaa as an intellectual and ideological vision places the Oromo man and woman at the
center of analysis and at the same time goes beyond Oromo society and aspires to develop global
Oromummaa. Oromummaa challenges the idea of glorifying African monarchies, chiefs, or
warlords that have collaborated with European slavers, colonizers and neo-colonialists and
destroyed Africa by participating in the slave trade and the projects of colonialism, neocolonialism, and global imperialism.
Those Africanist scholars who degrade African democratic traditions just as their EuroAmerican counterparts devalue the Oromo democratic system and consider indigenous Africans
such as the Oromo primitive and “stateless.” Challenging the view of Euro-American racist and
“modernist” scholars, Asmarom Legesse (2000: 30) asserts that “since monarchy was in decline
in most Europe, and the transition to democracy became the epitome of Europe’s highest
political aspirations, admitting that some varieties of democracy were firmly planted in Africa in
the 16th century when in fact they were not fully established in Britain, the United States and
France until the 17th or 18th century would have made the ideological premise of the ‘civilizing
mission’ somewhat implausible. The idea . . . that African democracies may have some
constitutional features, which are more advanced than their European counterpart was and still is
considered quite heretical.”
Although the priority of the Oromo national movement is to liberate Oromia and its
people, the movement has moral and political obligations to promote social justice and
democracy for other peoples who have suffered under the successive authoritarian-terrorist
governments of the Ethiopian Empire.
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Therefore, the Oromo movement needs to build a political alliance with national groups that
endorse the principles of national self- determination and multinational democracy. A democratic
Oromia should play a central role in a federated multinational democratic state because of its
democratic tradition, the size of its population, geopolitics, and abundant economic resources.
The Oromo national movement should demonstrate to Oromo society and their neighbors that
the Oromo nation is serious about statehood, shared sovereignty, and egalitarian multinational
democracy.
Oromummaa, as oppressed nationalism and a critical aspect of Afrocentric worldview,
builds on the best elements of Oromo culture and traditions and endorses an indigenous Oromo
democracy. As an aspect of Afrocentric worldview (Asante, 1990) that sees an African culture as
the center of African life and the African Diaspora, Oromummaa bases its vision on Oromo
popular democracy. The aspiration to restore this form of popular democracy is similar to the
idea of developing Afrocentric awareness in the African and African diaspora communities.
According to Molefi Kete Asante (1988: 49), a critical Afrocentric awareness develops “when
the person becomes totally changed to a conscious level of involvement in the struggle for his or
her own mind liberation. Only when this happens can we say that the person is aware of the
collective consciousness will. An imperative of will, powerful, incessant, alive, and vital, moves
to eradicate every trace of powerlessness.”
Those who endorse and glorify Ethiopianism are undermining this Afrocentric awareness
in order to enjoy power and material benefits at the cost of various African population groups.
Hence progressive Habashas, ordinary Amharas and Tigrayans, other Africans, and the African
Diaspora must recognize the negative consequences of Ethiopianism and support the struggle for
self-determination, multinational democracy, and development in Oromia, Ethiopia, and beyond.
Without recognizing the centrality of Africa for humanity in general and the significance of
indigenous African cultures in particular, we cannot develop “a victorious consciousness”
(Asante, 1988) that equips us with the knowledge of liberation. This knowledge of liberation
must be a critical Afrocentric one that “places the African person at the center of analysis” by
making “the African person subject, and not object, of study” (Asante, 1990). Similarly,
Oromummaa places the Oromo man and woman at the center of analysis and at the same time
goes beyond Oromo society and aspires to develop global Oromummaa by contributing to the
solidarity of all oppressed peoples and promoting the struggle for self-determination and
multinational democracy.
Recognizing the existence of various forms of indigenous African democracy before Africa
was partitioned and colonized and challenging Euro-American-centric scholarship and Ethiopian
studies that rationalize and justify racial/ethno-national inequality can help in developing a
human-centric and original scholarship. Learning about Oromo society—with its complex
democratic laws, an elaborate legislative tradition, and well-developed methods of dispute
settlement—and the Oromo national struggle can present a new perspective for Africana studies
and politics.
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Africans and the African Diaspora and other oppressed peoples can ally with one another on
global level by exchanging political and cultural experiences and re-creating the ideology of panAfricanism from “below” and by building global mutual solidarity based on the principles of
popular democracy and egalitarian world order. As globalization and transnational capitalism
intensify its barbarism and terrorism through looting and destroying indigenous population
groups, such as the Oromo, and others, the choice of establishing regional and global mutual
solidarity of the oppressed and exploited human groups on the principles of popular democracy
and egalitarian world order will become absolutely necessary. The Oromo classical civilization
can immensely contribute to such alternative liberation projects.
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